INTRODUCTION
The recent crises in developing economies in Asia and elsewhere have raised a number of theoretical issues and puzzles, many of which have important implications for economic policy. One of the most important is the question of what the appropriate exchange rate regime for small and open economies is. The seeming frequency with which "soft pegs" have been broken has led to the growing belief that developing economies must adopt corner solutions to exchange rates arrangements (CFR, 1999 and IFIAC, 2000) . In other words, it is argued that the only viable exchange rate option for such economies is flexibility, on the one hand, or credible pegging, on the other. A "credible peg" or "super fix" in turn refers to one of three possibilities: a currency board arrangement, effectively abandoning the domestic currency for a new currency (monetary union), or using domestically the currency of another country (dollarisation or eurorisation). This recommendation has come to be referred to as the "vanishing intermediate regime"
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. 1 Other adjectives used include the "missing / excluded middle", "death of the middle-of-the-road regimes" or the hallowing effect".
The official exchange rate classification by IMF suggests a sharp trend away from the intermediate arrangements (non-credible pegs) and towards floating regimes in particular (Table 1) .
However, Calvo and Reinhart (2000b) and Levy-Yeyati and Strurzenegger (1999) separately show that, in most cases, countries that proclaim themselves as having flexible exchange rates (based on 3 de jure IMF classification) in fact operate "soft pegs" or ''adjustable pegs" in practice. Calvo and Reinhart (2000b) go on to conclude that there is an acute and widespread "fear of floating" among developing and even some developed countries. Calvo and Reinhart (2000a) and Reinhart (2000) find that floating in developing countries in general has been limited to short time spans immediately following currency crises or hyperinflationary episodes. This ought not to be surprising in view of the well-documented problems with a floating regime.
Specifically, there is a near consensus that countries with flexible regimes have experienced "excessive" volatility over the last few decades with consequent negative impacts on trade, investment and growth (Bird and Rajan, forthcoming) . Even in the absence of a negative effect on the level of investment, insofar as flexible regimes have commonly been associated with currency misalignments, a flexible regime could have an adverse influence over the composition of investment as decisions may be based on disequilibrium prices (Williamson, 1999) .
In view of this there has been growing enthusiasm for the irrevocably fixed corner solution.
While Eichengreen (1999a) has concluded that a single, regional currency zone may be the most attractive option for small and open economies, but such an option is politically -if not economically -non-viable in East Asia anytime in the near future (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1999a,b) . Of course, countries could unilaterally abandon the domestic currency altogether by using domestically the currency of another country. Indeed, Hausmann (1999) has argued that developing countries in Latin America should form a monetary union with the US, or more specifically, they should abandon their respective national currencies in favour of the US dollar (dollarisation). While such a policy may well have merit in Latin America, the relatively low levels of dollarisation in Southeast Asian (compared with Latin America), on the one hand, and the economically significant 4 role played by Japan and the yen in Southeast and the larger East Asia, on the other, implies that dollarisation (let alone eurorisation or yenisation) is not a serious option for this region. Additionally, political compulsions may preclude the adoption of such a policy no matter what the cost-benefit calculus (national moneys often being seen as a symbol of national sovereignty).
For proponents of corner solutions, this therefore seems to leave a currency board as the sole option. For instance, in strongly advocating a currency board solution for developing economies, Dornbusch (1999) states that (n)ational central banks have been key players in creating the financial vulnerability that was the back drop of the crises of the past few year….There are few advantages to national money and none to a mismanaged one…But there is a genuine problem of what do with Asia…(J)ust pegging..(to)..the dollar may be a…solution -as suggested by Hong Kong, than mismanaged pegs or ad hoc policies. Such a hard peg, which is transparent and verifiable (Frankel et al., 2000) , is supposed to signal greater commitment to rule out arbitrary exchange rate adjustments (i.e. the escape clause cannot be invoked) along with the authorities' willingness to subordinate domestic policy objectives such as output and employment growth to the maintenance of the pegged exchange rate. But is this a reasonable position to adopt? Would Asian economies be well advised to follow this policy recommendation?
In order to answer these questions, we consider the experiences of Hong Kong and Singapore during the period of 1983/1984 to 1999. The choice of these two economies is dictated by the fact that both of them are small and open ones, are regional financial centers with broadly similar economic structures and with strong regional links (trade and investment), and are seen as having the soundest "fundamentals" in the region. These similarities imply that economies are exposed to 5 relatively similar external shocks, including the contagious fallout from the recent East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. Despite these commonalties, Singapore has pursued a soft peg based on a trade-weighted currency basket while the Hong Kong dollar is rigidly pegged to the US dollar via a currency board arrangement. This is despite both economies possessing fairly high degrees of internal flexibility. With these two economies, we therefore have a rare opportunity to undertake as close to a controlled laboratory experiment as one could hope for in real world international macroeconomics.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly reviews the exchange rate policies and macroeconomic performances of Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as highlights trends in effective exchange rates and export competitiveness in the two economies.
Section 3 briefly discusses the concept of the Natural Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate (NATREX) developed by Stein (1994 Stein ( , 1996 , focusing specifically on the operationalisation of the concept.
Section 4 then goes on to estimate the real equilibrium exchange rate for both currencies, an issue that is of particular importance to developing countries (Dornbusch, 1988 and Edwards, 2000) . In particular, we attempt to ascertain whether there is any evidence of misalignment in the two currencies. We also attempt to answer the more general question as to whether Hong Kong's currency board regime has "outperformed" the non-rules based intermediate regime pursued by Singapore over the last two decades as advocates of such a corner solution would have us believe.
The final section concludes the paper with an extended discussion of the costs and benefits of the exchange rate arrangements of the two economies and the policy options and implications thereof. During the initial period of present currency board system, the Hong Kong monetary authority (HKMA) was, by and large, passively following the automatic adjustment mechanism of the currency board. However, since 1988, Hong Kong has been characterised as having moved from a "rule-bound regime" to a "new regime in which active discretionary interventions were pursued" (Kwan et al., 1999) . This is so as the HKMA introduced several new key monetary instruments which allowed the policy makers the opportunity to engage in more discretionary intervention in the money and foreign exchange markets (Kwan et al., 1999) .
Singapore's Managed Float
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) manages the Singapore dollar against a basket of currencies of Singapore's main trading partners and competitors 2 . The central parity/level is determined in the basis of countries that are the main sources of imported inflation and competition in export markets. Estimates of derived weights suggest that the US dollar had a weight of about 0.6, the remainder being divided between the yen and other currencies ( Table 2 ). The Singapore dollar is allowed to float within an undisclosed target band around the computed central parity. Neither the 7 central parity nor the bandwidth is completely fixed, being periodically reviewed so as to ensure that they are "consistent with economics fundamentals and market conditions". In effect, the MAS seems to have adopted a "monitoring band" as opposed to a more conventional "crawling band", in which there is an obligation to defend the edges of the band. The obligation in the case of a monitoring band is "instead to avoid intervening within the band" (notwithstanding intermittent intervention to "smooth out" exchange rate fluctuations as opposed to trying to defend the currency) (Williamson, 1998) .
To illustrate the degree of flexibility -of the Singapore exchange rate policy, the MAS allowed the Singapore dollar to depreciate by about 20 percent during the height of the East Asian crisis; while more recently, it is suspected to have intervened heavily in the market to prop up the Singapore dollar during the bearishness against regional currencies following sharp falls in the NASDAQ (The Straits Times, May 12, 2000). Admittedly, this sort of monitoring band may be interpreted by some as being no different from a dirty floating regime. However, unlike a floating regime, with a monitoring band, the threat of possible intervention by the monetary authority may suffice to reduce speculative attacks. The point of a monitoring band (or a crawling band with soft edges) is that if the authority decides that market pressures are overwhelming, it can choose to allow the rate to take the strain even if this involves the rate going outside the band (Williamson, 1998) .
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s as a whole, the Singapore's adjustable peg regime has been complemented by a policy of steady appreciation of the Singapore dollar against a basket of major trading partner currencies so as to contain domestic cost pressures (Lu and Yu, 1999) . The key objective has been to insulate the domestic economy from the imported inflation. The appreciating trend was most clearly visible after 1986-87 ( Figure 2 ). 
Comparative Macroeconomic Performance, 1984 to 1998
Table 3 summarises some key macroeconomic indicators in Hong Kong and Singapore for the period between 1984 and 1998. As can be seen, while both economies have had comparably low unemployment rates, Singapore has, since the 1990s, consistently outperformed Hong Kong, both in terms of having experienced faster economic growth rates and lower rates of inflation. The differences in economic performances were particularly stark in the midst of the regional financial crisis. Open unemployment did rise in both economies in 1998. However, while Hong Kong's GDP fell by 5 percent (as opposed to an average of over 5 percent growth in the 1990s), Singapore was one of the few economies in East Asia to have achieved a positive growth of 0.5 percent that year (though this was sharply down from an average growth of almost 9 percent throughout the 1990s).
Trends in Effective Exchange Rates and Export Competitiveness
Figures 1 and 2 show close co-movements in the real effective exchange rate (REER) and nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) series for both economies. As can be seen, Hong Kong has on average experienced a stronger appreciation of the REER than the NEER. In contrast, in Singapore, the REER's appreciation was outpaced by that of the NEER 3 . Based on these trends one might have expected Hong Kong's export performance to lag behind that of Singapore's. In fact, overall export performance remained strong in both economies, growing at an average annual rate of 10.5 percent for Hong Kong and 11.4 percent for Singapore since early 1980's ( Figure 3 and 4).
However, when we decompose the overall exports into its two components of domestic exports and re-exports, a contrasting trend emerges. Most of Hong Kong's exports were attributed to re-exports, particularly since 1990. The growth rate of domestic exports stagnated between the period of 1990
and 1995 and has declined since 1996. The rapid appreciation of Hong Kong's REER did in fact lead to a steady erosion in the competitiveness of its domestic exports, especially between 1988 and 1997.
In the case of Singapore, both domestic exports and re-exports contributed to the overall impressive performance of overall exports.
THE NATREX MODEL
While the preceding discussion of trends in effective exchange rates is indicative, it is insufficient. To evaluate conclusively performance of the two exchange rate regimes, it is important to determine the respective consistency of the observed REERs of the two currencies against the underlying macroeconomic fundamentals of the respective economies. As noted by Edwards (2000) (e)xchange rate overvaluation is very costly, and has been at the heart of most recent currency crises. Defining effective methodologies to determine the presence of overvaluation is essential (p.2).
In other words, we need to ascertain some sort of "equilibrium benchmark" such that any deviations from that equilibrium rate at any point of time would be considered as evidence of currency's misalignment. To do so, we appeal to the concept of a Natural Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate (NATREX) model developed by Jerome Stein (1994 Stein ( , 1996 .
The NATREX is the rate that is determined by the prevailing real economic fundamentals in the economy. The NATREX model does not require us to assume any prior level of equilibrium exchange rate as a benchmark to estimate the misalignment of the currency. As Stein and Paladino of the major trading partner countries.
(1998) have emphasised, the NATREX model is directly amenable to empirical testing, without making any subjective judgments of what is: anticipated or unanticipated, permanent or transitory changes. It is based upon the attempt of micro agents, who make independent saving, investment, import and export decisions, to optimise when they know that there is significant uncertainty..The NATREX model is positive not normative..(it)..is precisely the real exchange rate associated with both internal and external balance (pp.1688-89 & 1712) .
Since Stein (1994 Stein ( , 1996 , Stein and Paladino (1998) and others since have extensively discussed the theoretical background of the NATREX model, we focus instead on a general working model of the concept (see Appendix A). This study closely examines quarterly movements of the two currencies during the period of 1983 to 1999. More specifically, the period of analysis for Singapore is Q1:1983 to Q3:1999. In order to limit any endogenous problems in our evaluation due to the initial stage of the currency board system in Hong Kong, we exclude the turbulent transition period of 1983 when the currency board system was established (having replaced a floating regime). Thus, for Hong Kong, the period under study is Q1:1984 to Q3:1999. Importantly, this time period encompasses the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. We further divide the observations into two sub-periods - pre-1990 and post-1990 . This allows us to evaluate whether the post-1990 period, which corresponded to the more discretionary intervention period in Hong Kong, was indeed associated with more severe misalignment.
Single Equation Estimation
The NATREX model does not require that the observed REER and the real equilibrium 11 rate be stationary. In fact, the NATREX will vary through time depending on the changes in the underlying fundamentals. In other words, it is a moving equilibrium exchange rate -a complete contrast from the underlying hypothesis of the PPP model, for instance (Edwards, 2000 and Edwards and Savastano, 1999) .
The NATREX approach starts with the assumption that there is a vector of fundamentals (z) which determines an economy's NATREX or equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER):
The small letters represent natural logs. (Stein, 1994 , 1996 , Edwards, 2000 and Edwards and Savastano, 1999 .
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Such single equation econometric models are commonly used in the literature on the determination of equilibrium real exchange rates (Edwards and Savastano, 1999 and Edwards, 2000) . where: reer is a natural log of observable real effective exchange rate. A dummy variable pol is also introduced for Singapore to capture the policy shift from a steady nominal depreciation managed floating to a gradual nominal appreciation policy in early 1986 as discussed in the previous section. Eqs. 2 and 3 seek the best fit of the REER on the economies' relevant exogenous economic fundamentals. We construct the equilibrium effective exchange rate for each economy's currency using the coefficient estimates obtained from regressing the above two equations (α and β).
Coefficient Estimates: What Theory Tells us
It is important to briefly highlight the prior signs of the coefficients to be expected based on the theoretical literature.
Government Expenditure (g): Following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) , we assume that government expenditure is disproportionately devoted to nontradables. As g rises, the relative demand for nontradables also goes up, triggering an increase in price of nontradables or a real appreciation, i.e. α 1 > 0, β 1 > 0.
World Real Interest Rate (r*): International interest rate arbitrage implies that when the return for foreign currency dominated assets (r*) exceeds local currency dominated assets (r), investors shift their portfolios away from local assets to foreign assets, i.e. α 2 < 0 and β 2 < 0.
Productivity (prd): An increase in productivity is expected to appreciate the domestic currency via the Balassa-Samuelson condition, i.e. β 3 > 0. Thus, an increase in capital stock should increase labour productivity in the tradables sector, translating into a fall in the price of tradables vis-à-vis nontradables, i.e. α 3 > 0.
Terms of Trade (tot): An improvement in the terms of trade will cause a capital inflow into the tradable sector. As discussed above, this implies that β 4 (α 4 ) > 0.
EMPIRICS
The data sources used in this study is presented in (Table 5 ). The
Akaike Criteria test determines the appropriate number of lag periods. However, given the potential presence of structural breaks in many time series variables, the low power of ADF test may not be sensitive enough to differentiate a stationary series from one that is nonstationary.
To evaluate the unit root property more structurally, we apply the next set of tests (Table 6 ). Both the minimal and maximal DickeyFuller t test statistics of the BLS rolling test are found to be significantly larger than each respective critical value. These test results confirm the findings of the ADF tests that the null hypothesis of nonstationarity at the 5 percent critical value cannot be rejected for all the key variables 6 .
Johansen Maximum Likelihood-Cointegration Test
Given all variables are I (1) We next construct the erer series by using the estimate coefficients. Figures 5 and 6 plot the fundamentally derived equilibrium exchange rates for the two currencies (hkerer and sgerer) against observed real effective equilibrium exchange rates (hkrer and sgrer). 
Testing for Stability in the Real Exchange Rate Series
We apply the following standard criterion as a condition for judging the stability of Hong Kong's real exchange rate regime:
That is, for the real exchange rate to be stable, its misalignment (captured by ε t ) from the equilibrium rate must be stationary. The ADF-unit root test is applied to ε t (eq. 5)7
. We divide the observations into two sub-periods -1980s (Q1:1984 to Q4:1991) and 1990s (Q1:1991 to Q3:1999). As with all regional economies, Hong Kong and Singapore experienced far more intense infusion of capital (especially portfolio capital) in the latter period (Kwan et al., 1999 ).
This two-period analysis also allows us to evaluate the implications of the more discretionary policy interventions in the financial and exchange rate market taken by HKMA in the 1990s.
Contrasting trends once again emerge (Table 9 ). We find the Hong Kong dollar to have been a stable currency in 1980s, but not in the 1990s. The null hypothesis of nonstationarity can be rejected in the 1980s but not for the 1990s. In contrast, the results for Singapore indicate a stable Singapore dollar in the last decade.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing empirical analysis indicates that the monitoring band mechanism accompanied by a policy of gradual nominal exchange rate appreciation has been relatively successful in insulating the Singapore economy from foreign price shocks and in maintaining a real effective exchange rate that has been consistent with the economy's underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. The currency was modestly undervalued but generally stable for most of the 1990s. In the spirit of the monitoring band (Williamson, 1998) . The independent policy measure taken by the HKMA in 1991 was part of the "more discretionary policy interventions" actively pursued since the late 1980s (Kwan et al., 1999) . The less transparent and more independent policies were in turn at least partly responsible for the growing misalignments in the 1990s. This reflected the fundamental cost of conducting independent monetary policies simultaneously with a currency board regime. This policy inconsistency contributed to a worsening in the overall macroeconomic performance of the economy (Table 3 ). The problems were exacerbated during the regional crisis as the currency's rigid peg to the US dollar led to an overvaluation of the Hong Kong dollar from the second quarter of 1997. This consequently motivated a speculative attack on the currency soon after the devaluation of the Taiwanese and Singapore currencies.
It is against this background that we conclude that the more flexible intermediate exchange rate regime in Singapore "has outperformed" the currency board system in Hong Kong in general, and particularly in the last decade when a series of external shocks hit the regional economies. This seems to support the analyses by and Williamson (1998 Williamson ( , 1999 On the one hand, by pursuing such an arrangement, the countries may be able to cushion their vulnerability to fluctuations in the currencies of its major economic partners, thus limiting variations in the effective exchange rate. Such a system may be a way of trading off the disciplinary and credibility benefits of a pegged regime with the flexibility of a floating one. However, there is of course a Catch-22 involved with a currency board arrangement: an economy faced with sharp external shock may require some degree of discretion to mitigate the effects of these shocks. Failing this, there could be a build up of imbalances, consequently making a currency ripe for a speculative attack. However, it is this very discretion that undermines the credibility and concomitant benefits of a super fix. As noted, Hong Kong had pursued such a discretionary policy in the 1990s, resulting in a sustained attack on the Hong
Kong dollar in the midst of the crisis, as agents understandably doubted the commitments of the HKMA to the currency board arrangement (the resulting painful macroeconomic consequences were highlighted in section 2). Indications are that Hong Kong has deemphasised discretion and returned to a rule-based regime since the crisis (i.e. post 1998) (Kwan et al., 1999) . While this reversion to "auto pilot" may help to shore up the credibility of the arrangement, there is always the concern about the consequences of such inherent external rigidity when the next external shock hits and the entire adjustment must take place internally.
Does all of this imply therefore that Hong Kong would be well advised to forsake its currency board regime in favour of a Singapore-type intermediate regime with more flexibility? The preceding analysis seems to suggest a firm "yes". However, this conclusion would be premature, as we have not paid attention to a number of other issues.
First, the orchestration of an exit from a fixed exchange rate regime to a flexible one is a difficult manoeuvre which could be destabilising (Eichengreen, 1999b and Eichengreen et al., 1999) . This issue is of particular relevance to Hong Kong as the authorities have a single currency and multicurrency or basket currency arrangement.
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invested a great deal of resources to rebuild confidence in the exchange regime following the regional financial crisis. One cannot be sure if the end game is necessarily worth it 11 .
11 In fact, the Singapore experience of exit from a hard peg has been held up as a role model of sorts for how other economies could successfully exit their pegs (Eichengreen, 1999) .
Second, in the event that policy makers lack credibility and are not as immune to political pressures, there is virtue in conducting macroeconomic policy under a rules-based system (i.e. "disciplining device"). A currency board arrangement, which establishes a firm link between base money supply and the stock in international reserves may discipline policy makers and ensures policy transparency and thus credibility. In this regard, the worst regime would seem to be a rule-based one which allows scope for policy makers to exercise discretion. This of course undermines -if not completely negates -the advantages of a rulebased regime. Thus, the NATREX model adds dynamic stock -flow interactions to the standard macroeconomic approach balance model. Their inclusion of the dynamic equations allows the NATREX to vary over time, reflecting the changes on the fundamental variables. In the 
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